(with some noted originally from Bill Sherman NCSA, and others from my CS 422 course)
| CS 422 |
User Interface Design | Focus on developing effective
user
interfaces |
Every spring |
| CS 426 |
Video Game Programming | Focus on creating complete audio visual interactive (and fun) experiences | Every term |
| CS 488 |
Computer Graphics I | Focus on the basics of how computers create images on screens, OpenGL | Once per year |
| CS 522 |
Human Computer Interaction | Focus on interaction and evaluation of interactive environments | Every fall |
| CS 523 |
Multi-Media Systems | Focus on the creation of Educational Worlds | Once per year |
| CS 525 |
GPU Programming | Focus on shaders and parallel processing | Fall even years |
| CS 526 |
Computer Graphics II | Focus on Scientific Visualization |
Spring odd years |
| CS 527 |
Computer Animation | Focus on creating realistic motion | Spring even years |
| CS 528 |
Virtual Reality | Focus on immersion | Fall odd years |
Scientific Visualization
Webster defines Visualization as:
Hamming: "The purpose of computing is insight not numbers"
What are the advantages? (adapted from [Ware 2000])
How
do we make good visualizations? (adapted from [Tufte 1983])
We
start off
talking about Charles Joseph Minard's 1861
graphic showing Napoleon's losses during his 1812 march to and from
Moscow - possibly the best statistical graph ever drawn ... why?

from p41 of The Visual
Display of Quantitative Information
The
chart show 6
variables
Here are a couple simple examples where 2d visualiztion techniques in one case did have and in the second case should have had an important positive effect that I like to use as examples in the User Interface Design and Programming course:
The first was a visualization created by Dr. John Snow(1813-1858) a distinguished British Anesthesiologist who plotted over 500 deaths in central London from Cholera in September 1854.
Here
is the graphic reprinted in the Visual Display of Quantitative
Information, p24 (there is another good related map in Visual
Explanations, P30.)
A really good book to read if you are interested in this is 'The Ghost Map' by Steven Johnson, published in 2006. If you prefer, there is a TED talk here: http://www.ted.com/talks/steven_johnson_tours_the_ghost_map.html
And
more information is available online at:
http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/snow.html
If
you want to look at this area now, you can tell google earth to go to
'Golden Square, London, Greater London, W1F, UK'

one of the
original maps by John Snow

(E.W. Gilbert's
simplified version of John Snow's map - more
information on this version can be found at:
http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/snow/cartographica39(4)1_14_2004.pdf)
Deaths are marked by dots and the location of the 11 water pumps in the area are marked with Xs. The deaths seemed centered around the Broad St. pump. When people stopped using the pump, the epidemic ceased. Note that at the time the infectious theory of disease was not generally accepted. Disease was believed to be caused by morbid poisons coming from dead bodies and decaying organic matter, and spread through the air.
Here
is some of his own text: (full text available at
http://bbh.hhdev.psu.edu/courses/440/SnowCholera/snow_on_cholera_exercise.htm)
"Very few of the fifty-six attacks placed in the table to the 31st August occurred till late in the evening of that day. The eruption was extremely sudden, as I learn from the medical men living in the midst of the district, and commenced in the night between the 31st August and 1st September."
"The greatest number of attacks in any one day occurred on the 1st of September, immediately after the outbreak commenced. The following day the attacks fell from one hundred and forty-three to one hundred and sixteen, and the day afterwards to fifty-four. A glance at the above table will show that the fresh attacks continued to become less numerous every day. On September the 8th-- the day when the handle of the pump was removed--there were twelve attacks; on the 9th, eleven: on the 10th, five: on the llth, five; on the 12th, only one: and after this time, there were never more than four attacks on one day. During the decline of the epidemic the deaths were more numerous than the attacks, owing to the decease of many persons who had lingered for several days in consecutive fever.
The
last sentence above is important to note. Snow himself can not state
that removing the pump handle definitively stopped the outbreak.
Here is some of the actual data:
| Date | # of Fatal Attacks | Deaths | |
| 8/19 | 1 | 1 | |
| 8/20 | 1 | 0 | |
| 8/21 | 1 | 2 | |
| 8/22 | 0 | 0 | |
| 8/23 | 1 | 0 | |
| 8/24 | 1 | 2 | |
| 8/25 | 0 | 0 | |
| 8/26 | 1 | 0 | |
| 8/27 | 1 | 1 | |
| 8/28 | 1 | 0 | |
| 8/29 | 1 | 1 | |
| 8/30 | 8 | 2 | |
| 8/31 | 56 | 3 | |
| 9/01 | 143 | 70 | |
| 9/02 | 116 | 127 | |
| 9/03 | 54 | 76 | |
| 9/04 | 46 | 71 | |
| 9/05 | 36 | 45 | 10% of
the neighbourhood dead in 1 week |
| 9/06 | 20 | 37 | |
| 9/07 | 28 | 32 | |
| 9/08 | 12 | 30 |
pump handle removed |
| 9/09 |
11 |
24 |
|
| 9/10 |
5 |
18 |
|
| 9/11 |
5 |
15 |
|
| 9/12 |
1 |
6 |
|
| 9/13 |
3 |
13 |
|
| 9/14 |
0 |
6 |
|
| 9/15 |
1 |
8 |
|
| 9/16 |
4 |
6 |
|
| 9/17 |
2 |
5 |
|
| 9/18 |
3 |
2 |
|
| 9/19 |
0 |
3 |
|
| 9/20 |
0 |
0 |
|
| 9/21 |
2 |
0 |
|
| 9/22 |
1 |
2 |
|
| 9/23 |
1 |
3 |
|
| 9/24 |
1 |
0 |
|
| 9/25 |
1 |
0 |
|
| 9/26 |
1 |
2 |
|
| 9/27 |
1 |
0 |
|
| 9/28 |
0 |
2 |
|
| 9/29 |
0 |
1 |
and a chart of that
data:

John Snow's visualization has a number of good features that you should
strive for:
1.
Place data in the appropriate context for assessing cause and effect
2. Allow the viewer to make quantitative comparisons
3. Encourage search for alternative explanations and contrary
cases
4. Indicate level of certainty and possible errors in the data
but its not just about making a graphic, but making a good graphic. A bad graphic may hide the truth.
This was
the last great cholera outbreak in London.
Of local note there is an urban legend that Chicago had 80,000+ fatalities from cholera when in August 1885 a rainstorm dropped 7" of rain on Chicago in one day, overflowing the drainage systems and causing raw sewage to flow into the lake and back into the cities drinking water. The storm happened, the fatalities did not thanks to a shift in the winds.
The
second is a discussion of the Challenger disaster with refs from
Tufte's "Visual Explanations."
The
engineers at Morton Thiokol who designed the solid rocket boosters for
the shuttle opposed the launch and faxed 13 diagrams to NASA management
to make their case - they failed in large part because of what
infomation they chose to present and the way they presented that
information, but also because of time and information constraints.
There is a nice
overview here:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2007/01/remembering-the-mistakes-of-challenger/
including the
following:
‘We
discussed what might happen below our 40 degree qualification
temperature and practically to a man we decided it would be
catastrophic,’ added Morton Thiokol's Bob Ebeling.
‘Thiokol
recommended that we could not launch until the weather warmed up in the
afternoon,’ said NASA senior manager Jud Lovingood. ‘Well I told them
they couldn’t make that recommendation. They had to give us a
temperature that we could launch with.’
A formal presentation would have to be made, two hours after speaking
with Lovingood and just 15 hours before launch, via a teleconference at
which Thiokol would need to given their reasoning for a no launch
decision – a power contractors held, but were scared to make given the
effects on the Shuttle schedule.
Thiokol engineer Roger Boisjoly – one of two specialists (the other
being Arnie Thompson) on the SRB joint seals – grabbed anything he
could from his office to show how the temperature would lead to a
failure of the SRB’s O-ring and the destruction of the Shuttle.
‘Unfortunately in our rush we didn’t have time for a dry run at what
we’d present to NASA,’ noted Boisjoly. ‘I had no idea what my
colleagues would present and I had no idea what I’d bring to the
meeting.’
‘The
entire Thiokol group recommended no launch,’ remembered Ebeling, as
they recommended a minimum launch temperature of 53F (11C). The
expected rubber stamping of that recommendation was expected from NASA
on the other end of the teleconference. However, they would be proven
wrong.
There
had been several earlier flights with O-ring problems and the issues
were being worked through to create a less flawed design, so NASA knew
there were continuing concerns, but the amount of data available from
the 24 previous shuttle flights was limited. For example the Morton
Thiokol engineers did not have temperature data available for all of
the previous shuttle flights (air temperature, or the much more useful
O-ring temperature.) Seven earlier flights had O-ring issues, and those
launches were at temperatures (F) of 53, 57, 58, 63, 70, 70, 75, and
only two of those had serious 'blow by' issues, one at 53F and one at
75F. There were problems when it was warm; there were problems when it
was cool. No shuttle had launched below 53 degrees F before.
The key table that
the engineers produced was:

Even after the disaster and the during the investigation when there was more time and more information available bad graphics were still being created. Looking at the O-Ring damage over the previous 24 shuttle missions, the data was presented in chronological order showing the location and extent of the damage sustained to the left and right boosters and the temperature at launch time. This hides the pattern.
If
instead of using chronological order the same data was presented in
ascending temperature order the pattern is a bit more clear
If
instead we remove all the extraneous imagery and do a simple plot of
temperature vs damage (a weighted average of erosion, heating, and
blow-by) then the pattern becomes much clearer. To really do analysis
you would still want to be able to get access to the more detailed data
- this just gives you a nice overview.
The
Challenger example gets talked about a lot in terms of ethics and
responsibility and there are various views on the topic. One lengthy
critique of Tufte's conclusions (which brings up several very important
points but also reads into Tufte's work an attitude that I do not feel
while reading it) is given here:
http://www.onlineethics.org/cms/17453.aspx
sci-viz
still very much an art - algorithms and routines are a starting point
but it takes experience and creativity to use them effectively
How big is an acre
Here is a comparison of a good graphic and a bad graphic, making use of a Choropleth map, dealing with Radon from Things that Make Us Smart, p70-71.
Why is the first version bad:
- density scale is not an ordered additive sequence - the viewer must keep referring back to the legendYou
should start taking a look at vtk by going to www.vtk.org and grabbing
an executable version or the source code to compile.
Another
very nice piece of software built on top of vtk is ParaView
(www.paraview.org) which acts like a front end to vtk and encourages
you to read in datasets and apply filters and generate visualizations.
I would suggest downloading paraview and start playing with it. Version
3 is in alpha testing and is pretty stable, though it doesn't have all
of the filters from version 2 implemented yet.