Week 14

Visual Analytics



We've talked about various pieces of visual analytics throughout the course - this brings all of that together into a process.

The bible of the field is James J. Thomas and Kristin A. Cook. Illuminating the Path: The Research and Development Agenda for Visual Analytics. IEEE Computer Society, 2005. ISBN: 0-7695-2323-4. [Available online as a free PDF.]

A much shorter overview whitepaper from the University of Konstanz: http://infovis.uni-konstanz.de/papers/2009/edbs2008.pdf

"Visual Analytics is the science of analytical reasoning facilitated by interactive visual interfaces. People use visual analytics tools and techniques to synthesize information and derive insight from massive, dynamic, ambiguous, and often conflicting data, provide timely, defensible, and understandable assessments; and communicate assessment effectively for action. The overall goal is to detect the expected and discover the unexpected. "

The goal of visual analytics is to facilitate this analytical reasoning process through the creation of software that maximizes human capacity to perceive, understand, and reason about complex and dynamic data and situations.

It must build upon an understanding of the reasoning process, as well as an understanding of underlying cognitive and perceptual principles, to provide mission-appropriate interactions that allow analysts to have a true discourse with their information. The goal is to facilitate high-quality human judgment with a limited investment of the analysts’ time.

Here are a couple diagrams from the Konstanz whitepaper:






Visual analytics is a multidisciplinary field that includes the following focus areas:
An analysis session is a dialogue between the analyst and the data where the visual representation is the interface into the data.

The use of visual representations and interactions to accelerate rapid insight into complex data is what distinguishes visual analytics software from other types of analytical tools. Visual representations translate data into a visible form that highlights important features, including commonalities and anomalies. These visual representations make it easy for users to perceive salient aspects of their data quickly. Augmenting the cognitive reasoning process with perceptual reasoning through visual representations permits the analytical reasoning process to become faster and more focused.

Visual representations invite the user to explore his or her data. This exploration requires that the user be able to interact with the data to understand trends and anomalies, isolate and reorganize information as appropriate, and engage in the analytical reasoning process. It is through these interactions that the analyst achieves insight.


Analysts may be asked to perform several different types of tasks:


Steps in the Analytical Process
  1. Determine how to address the issue that has been posed, what resources to use, and how to allocate time to various parts of the process to meet deadlines.
  2. Gather information containing the relevant evidence and become familiar with it, and incorporate it with the knowledge he or she already has.
  3. Generate multiple candidate hypotheses.
  4. Evaluate these alternative explanations in light of evidence and assumptions to reach a judgment about the most likely explanations or outcomes.
  5. Consider alternative explanations that were not previously considered.
  6. Create reports, presentations, or other products that summarize the analytical judgments. These products summarize the judgments made and the supporting reasoning that was developed, and the uncertainties that remain during the analytical process. These products can then be shared with others.

Analysts must deal with data that is dynamic, incomplete, often deceptive, and evolving and they often must come to conclusions within a limited period of time.


Analysis products are expected to clearly communicate the assessment or forecast, the evidence on which it is based, knowledge gaps or unknowns, the analyst’s degree of certainty in the judgment, and any significant alternatives and their indicators.

Visual analytics systems must capture this information and facilitate its presentation in ways that meet the needs of the recipient of the information.



Its very important to quickly identify competing explanations and chains of reasoning for the issue under study and actively maintain awareness of those competing idea so that they are kept “alive” as analytic possibilities.

Often the most plausible explanation will be researched extensively, analysts should always revisit the key alternatives. Visual analytics tools must facilitate the analyst’s task of actively considering competing hypotheses.

Another important analytic technique is the enumeration and testing of assumptions. Explicit representation of these assumptions facilitates this process.



want 'constant' feedback from the visualization application:

~100 milliseconds. Bare minimum update rate to perceive smooth animation (50 ms is a better minimum)

~1 second. Simple user actions (bringing up a menu, making a menu selection, etc) should get a response or some feedback (progress bar appears) within this time.

~10 seconds. More complex user actions
(generating a new view of the data, doing a complex query) should get a response or some feedback (progress bar appears) within this time.

~100 seconds (minutes to hours). Higher level reasoning processes, including the analytic reasoning take place in this time frame.




Issues with streaming data

  1. Provide situational awareness for data streams.
  2. Show changes in the state of the system and help users identify when the changes are significant.
  3. Fuse various types of information to provide an integrated view of the information.



One part of this process that we haven't talked much about is the reporting phase - taking the results of an analysis and presenting them to the target audience.

Discussion of the Challenger disaster with refs from Tufte's "Visual Explanations."

The Challenger example gets talked about a lot in terms of ethics and responsibility and there are various views on the topic. One lengthy critique of Tufte's conclusions (which brings up several very important points but also reads into Tufte's work an attitude that I do not feel while reading it) is given here:
http://www.onlineethics.org/cms/17453.aspx

Just for reference, here is a photo of Atlantis on the launch pad:

Space Shuttle
          Atlantis photo

The engineers at Morton Thiokol who designed the solid rocket boosters for the shuttle opposed the launch  of Challenger and faxed 13 diagrams to NASA management to make their case - they failed in large part because of what information they chose to present and the way they presented that information, but also because of time and information constraints.

There is a nice overview here:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2007/01/remembering-the-mistakes-of-challenger/

including the following:

‘We discussed what might happen below our 40 degree qualification temperature and practically to a man we decided it would be catastrophic,’ added Morton Thiokol's Bob Ebeling.

‘Thiokol recommended that we could not launch until the weather warmed up in the afternoon,’ said NASA senior manager Jud Lovingood. ‘Well I told them they couldn’t make that recommendation. They had to give us a temperature that we could launch with.’

A formal presentation would have to be made, two hours after speaking with Lovingood and just 15 hours before launch, via a teleconference at which Thiokol would need to given their reasoning for a no launch decision – a power contractors held, but were scared to make given the effects on the Shuttle schedule.

Thiokol engineer Roger Boisjoly – one of two specialists (the other being Arnie Thompson) on the SRB joint seals – grabbed anything he could from his office to show how the temperature would lead to a failure of the SRB’s O-ring and the destruction of the Shuttle.

‘Unfortunately in our rush we didn’t have time for a dry run at what we’d present to NASA,’ noted Boisjoly. ‘I had no idea what my colleagues would present and I had no idea what I’d bring to the meeting.’

‘The entire Thiokol group recommended no launch,’ remembered Ebeling, as they recommended a minimum launch temperature of 53F (11C). The expected rubber stamping of that recommendation was expected from NASA on the other end of the teleconference. However, they would be proven wrong.

There had been several earlier flights with O-ring problems and the issues were being worked through to create a less flawed design, so NASA knew there were continuing concerns, but the amount of data available from the 24 previous shuttle flights was limited. For example the Morton Thiokol engineers did not have temperature data available for all of the previous shuttle flights (air temperature, or the much more useful O-ring temperature.) Seven earlier flights had O-ring issues, and those launches were at temperatures (F) of 53, 57, 58, 63, 70, 70, 75, and only two of those had serious 'blow by' issues, one at 53F and one at 75F. There were problems when it was warm; there were problems when it was cool. No shuttle had launched below 53 degrees F before.

Mr Mulloy, the Solid Rocket Booster Project Manager,  testified: It was Thiokol's calculation of what the lowest temperature an O-ring had seen in previous flights, and the engineering recommendation was that we should not move outside of that experience base.

Another person present said "One of my colleagues that was in the meeting summed it up best. This was a meeting where the determination was to launch, and it was up to us to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that it was not safe to do so. This is in total reverse to what the position usually is in a pre-flight conversation or a flight readiness review. It is usually exactly opposite that."

The key table that the engineers produced was:

One of the Thiokol Memos to
        NASA

The table shows that there were problems seen in four rocket tests, and two actual launches, and then what the assumption would be for the temperatures at the Challenger launch. This table should also be seen in the larger context of many years of work between NASA and Morton Thiokol on the development of the rockets, so everyone involved in the meeting should have been able to put this data into context. One thing this table leaves out is data on tests and launches where there were no problems.

The Rogers Commission shows this data in a graphical form as well as a revised version which gives context by showing launches with no problems here


When NASA basically asked Morton Thiokol to prove that it was unsafe to launch the engineers were given an almost impossible task given the time and information available to them.

chapter 5 of the Rogers report gives a lot of detail on this.

and there is some interesting reading here:
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v4p740.htm


and some of the findings:

l. The Commission concluded that there was a serious flaw in the decision making process leading up to the launch of flight 51-L. A well structured and managed system emphasizing safety would have flagged the rising doubts about the Solid Rocket Booster joint seal. Had these matters been clearly stated and emphasized in the flight readiness process in terms reflecting the views of most of the Thiokol engineers and at least some of the Marshall engineers, it seems likely that the launch of 51-L might not have occurred when it did.

4. The Commission concluded that the Thiokol Management reversed its position and recommended the launch of 51-L, at the urging of Marshall and contrary to the views of its engineers in order to accommodate a major customer.



Back to Tufte:

Even after the disaster and the during the investigation when there was more time and more information available bad graphics were still being created. Looking at the O-Ring damage over the previous 24 shuttle missions, the data was presented in chronological order showing the location and extent of the damage sustained to the left and right boosters and the temperature at launch time. This hides the pattern.

O-Ring
            Damage Chart Presented to Congress

If instead of using chronological order the same data was presented in ascending temperature order the pattern is a bit more clear

Another O-Ring Chart PResented to Congress

If instead we remove all the extraneous imagery and do a simple plot of temperature vs damage (a weighted average of erosion, heating, and blow-by) as shown below then the pattern becomes much clearer which is the point that Tufte stresses. This chart is almost the same as the revised Rogers Commision chart in pdf form above.

To really do analysis you would still want to be able to get access to the more detailed data - this just gives you a nice overview.

Simplified O-Ring
          Damage Plot
(note that 15 and 22 mentioned in the original memo are highlighted in this chart)

The Rogers Commission report on the Challenger can be found at:
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/genindex.htm


Discussion of Columbia disaster in 2003 with refs from Tufte's "Beautiful Evidence" - how you organize, present text, and choose words can be just as dangerous as how you present graphical information. Do all of the necessary words even fit readably on a PowerPoint slide?

Unlike Challenger, this time the issue was less about what the engineers knew and more about what they did not know and their inability to convince their managers to get them more information from the astronauts in space or department of defense imagery.

The results of an analysis needed to be succinctly presented in a report or set of PowerPoint slides, with the bulk of the analysis sitting in a very big report that may not be read. Tufte spends a fair amount of time in this book talking about the dangers inherent in a PowerPoint presentation.

http://www.edwardtufte.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg?msg_id=0001yB&topic_id=1&topic=Ask+E%2eT%2e

first a bit of background from the Columbia report which we will hit the highlights of ...

"Columbia was launched from Launch Com- plex 39-A on January 16, 2003, at 10:39 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST). At 81.7 seconds after launch, when the Shuttle was at about 65,820 feet and traveling at Mach 2.46 (1,650 mph), a large piece of hand-crafted insulating foam came off an area where the Orbiter attaches to the External Tank. At 81.9 seconds, it struck the leading edge of Columbiaʼs left wing. This event was not detected by the crew on board or seen by ground support teams until the next day, during detailed reviews of all launch camera photography and videos. This foam strike had no apparent effect on the daily conduct of the 16-day mission, which met all its objectives."

"Post-launch photographic analysis showed that one large piece and at least two smaller pieces of insulating foam separated from the External Tank left bipod (–Y) ramp area at 81.7 seconds after launch. Later analysis showed that the larger piece struck Columbia on the underside of the left wing, around Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels 5 through 9, at 81.9 seconds after launch (see Figure 2.3-2). Further photographic analysis conducted the day after launch revealed that the large foam piece was approximately 21 to 27 inches long and 12 to 18 inches wide, tumbling at a minimum of 18 times per second, and moving at a relative velocity to the Shuttle Stack of 625 to 840 feet per second (416 to 573 miles per hour) at the time of impact."

Columbia Launch Photo

"The objectʼs large size and the apparent momentum transfer concerned Intercenter Photo Working Group personnel, who were worried that Columbia had sustained damage not detectable in the limited number of views their tracking cameras captured. This concern led the Intercenter Photo Working Group Chair to request, in anticipation of analystsʼ needs, that a high-resolution image of the Orbiter on-orbit be obtained by the Department of Defense. By the Boardʼs count, this would be the first of three distinct requests to image Columbia on-orbit. The exact chain of events and circumstances surrounding the movement of each of these requests through Shuttle Program Management, as well as the ultimate denial of these requests, is a topic of Chapter 6."

Columbia Wing

RCC Panel life time

and here are a couple photos of that same area on Endeavour, taken in the summer of 2015

"Without on-orbit pictures of Columbia, the Debris Assessment Team was restricted to using a mathematical modeling tool called Crater to assess damage, although it had not been designed with this type of impact in mind. Team members concluded over the next six days that some localized heating damage would most likely occur during re-entry, but they could not definitively state that structural damage would result. On January 24, the Debris Assessment Team made a presentation of these results to the Mission Evaluation Room, whose manager gave a verbal summary (with no data) of that presentation to the Mission Management Team the same day. The Mission Management Team declared the debris strike a “turnaround” issue and did not pursue a request for imagery."

"Boeing analysts conducted a preliminary damage assessment on Saturday. Using video and photo images, they generated two estimates of possible debris size – 20 inches by 20 inches by 2 inches, and 20 inches by 16 inches by 6 inches – and determined that the debris was traveling at a approximately 750 feet per second, or 511 miles per hour, when it struck the Orbiter at an estimated impact angle of less than 20 degrees. These estimates later proved remarkably accurate."

"To calculate the damage that might result from such a strike, the analysts turned to a Boeing mathematical modeling tool called Crater that uses a specially developed algorithm to predict the depth of a Thermal Protection System tile to which debris will penetrate. This algorithm, suitable for estimating small (on the order of three cubic inches) debris impacts, had been calibrated by the results of foam, ice, and metal debris impact testing. "

"Until STS-107, Crater was normally used only to predict whether small debris, usually ice on the External Tank, would pose a threat to the Orbiter during launch. Engineers used Crater during STS-107 to analyze a piece of debris that was at maximum 640 times larger in volume than the pieces of debris used to calibrate and validate the Crater model (the Boardʼs best estimate is that it actually was 400 times larger)."

"For the Thermal Protection System tile, Crater predicted damage deeper than the actual tile thickness. This seemingly alarming result suggested that the debris that struck Columbia would have exposed the Orbiterʼs underlying aluminum airframe to extreme temperatures, resulting in a possible burn-through during re-entry. Debris Assessment Team engineers discounted the possibility of burn through for two reasons. First, the results of calibration tests with small projectiles showed that Crater predicted a deeper penetration than would actually occur. Second, the Crater equation does not take into account the increased density of a tileʼs lower “densified” layer, which is much stronger than tileʼs fragile outer layer. Therefore, engineers judged that the actual damage from the large piece of foam lost on STS-107 would not be as severe as Crater predicted, and assumed that the debris did not penetrate the Orbiterʼs skin."

"Prior to STS-107, Crater analysis was the responsibility of a team at Boeingʼs Huntington Beach facility in California, but this responsibility had recently been transferred to Boeingʼs Houston office. Even though STS-107ʼs debris strike was 400 times larger than the objects Crater is designed to model, neither Johnson engineers nor Program managers appealed for assistance from the more experienced Huntington Beach engineers, who might have cautioned against using Crater so far outside its validated limits. Nor did safety personnel provide any additional oversight. NASA failed to connect the dots: the engineers who misinterpreted Crater – a tool already unsuited to the task at hand – were the very ones the Shuttle Program identified as engendering the most risk in their transition from Huntington Beach."

"Columbia re-entered Earthʼs atmosphere with a pre-existing breach in the leading edge of its left wing in the vicinity of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panel 8. This breach, caused by the foam strike on ascent, was of sufficient size to allow superheated air (probably exceeding 5,000 degrees Fahrenheit) to penetrate the cavity behind the RCC panel. The breach widened, destroying the insulation protecting the wingʼs leading edge support structure, and the superheated air eventually melted the thin aluminum wing spar. Once in the interior, the superheated air began to destroy the left wing."

"By the time Columbia passed over the coast of California in the pre-dawn hours of February 1, at Entry Interface plus 555 seconds, amateur videos show that pieces of the Orbiter were shedding. Analysis indicates that the Orbiter continued to fly its pre-planned flight profile, although, still unknown to anyone on the ground or aboard Columbia, her control systems were working furiously to maintain that flight profile. Finally, over Texas, just southwest of Dallas-Fort Worth, the increasing aerodynamic forces the Orbiter experienced in the denser levels of the atmosphere overcame the catastrophically damaged left wing, causing the Orbiter to fall out of control at speeds in excess of 10,000 mph."

Columbia Debris


and for a bit of perspective:

One debris strike in particular foreshadows the STS-107 event. When Atlantis was launched on STS-27R on December 2, 1988, the largest debris event up to that time significantly damaged the Orbiter. Post-launch analysis of tracking camera imagery by the Intercenter Photo Working Group identified a large piece of debris that struck the Thermal Protection System tile at approximately 85 seconds into the flight. On Flight Day Two, Mission Control asked the flight crew to inspect Atlantis with a camera mounted on the remote manipulator arm, a robotic device that was not installed on Columbia for STS-107. Mission Commander R.L. “Hoot” Gibson later stated that Atlantis “looked like it had been blasted by a shotgun.”18 Concerned that the Orbiterʼs Thermal Protection System had been breached, Gibson ordered that the video be transferred to Mission Control so that NASA engineers could evaluate the damage.

When Atlantis landed, engineers were surprised by the extent of the damage. Post-mission inspections deemed it “the most severe of any mission yet flown.” The Orbiter had 707 dings, 298 of which were greater than an inch in one dimension.


Tile Damage on Shuttle
          Missions

Below is the Tufte analysis of the powerpoints used by the Debris Assessment Team, which is also part of the official report:

Columbia Powerpoint #1

Columbia Powerpoint #2

again from the report:

"As information gets passed up an organization hierarchy, from people who do analysis to mid-level managers to high-level leadership, key explanations and supporting information is filtered out. In this context, it is easy to understand how a senior manager might read this PowerPoint slide and not realize that it addresses a life-threatening situation."

"At many points during its investigation, the Board was surprised to receive similar presentation slides from NASA officials in place of technical reports. The Board views the endemic use of PowerPoint briefing slides instead of technical papers as an illustration of the problematic methods of technical communication at NASA."

The complete Columbia report can be found at http://caib.nasa.gov/
http://caib.nasa.gov/news/report/pdf/vol1/full/caib_report_volume1.pdf




Coming Next Time

Project 3 Presentations


last revision 8/15/15